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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FAMILIES
WITH CHILDREN AND HANDICAPPED
PERSONS UNDER THE 1988
AMENDMENTS TO THE FAIR HOUSING
ACT
Michael P. Seng*
The 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act extend protection to families with children and to handicapped persons. Although
these groups had been given some limited protection under the
United States Constitution and under federal law when the discrimination involved publicly owned or financed housing or certain exclusionary zoning practices, no federal law protected these groups
from discrimination in private housing prior to the passage of these
amendments. The Fair Housing Act now sets up a comprehensive
scheme to protect persons from discrimination on the basis of handicap or their having children, as well as on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin.
In promulgating regulations under the new amendments, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") has extended the same protections to families with children, and to the
handicapped, as are extended to classifications based on race and
sex.' Critics argued against using the same standard on the ground
that families with children and persons with handicaps, both mental
and physical, are different in terms of their housing requirements
and the impact of their presence on a community from persons who
are considered on the basis of race or sex.2 Commenters suggested to
HUD that the appropriate standard for evaluating differential treatment given families with children and the handicapped should be
that developed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. The author
would like to thank Mr. William H. Jones, J.D., The John Marshall Law School, for
his assistance in preparation of this article.
1. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3231,
3236 (Jan. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Fair Housing Regulations].
2. Robert D. Butters (General Counsel, National Ass'n of Realtors), remarks at
the Fair Housing-Fair Lending Legal Seminar for Attorneys and Officials of Lending
Institutions (January 25-26, 1989) (available in the John Marshall Law School
Library).
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amendment - differential treatment could be justified by a rational
relationship to legitimate interests.' However, HUD noted that the
underpinnings for the Fair Housing Act are rooted in the Commerce
Clause, as well as in the fourteenth amendment, and that the legislative history of the Act and the development of fair housing law supported "the position that persons with handicaps and families with
children must be provided the same protection as other classes of
persons.""
I. DiscriminationAgainst Families with Children
A. History of and the Need for Federal Legislation
The House Report favoring the extension of the Fair Housing
Act to families with children cites statistics to show the serious impact of this form of discrimination on the housing market:
In the latest national survey of discrimination based on familial status, HUD found that 25 percent of all rental units did not allow children; 50 percent were subject to restrictive policies that limited the
ability of families to live in those units; and almost 20 percent of families were living in homes they considered less desirable because of restrictive practices.
In another survey HUD found that 99 percent of respondents reported numerous problems related to housing discrimination against
children. Of these respondents, 55 percent had searched for housing
for over 9 weeks; 47 percent reported living in substandard conditions;
22 percent had been forced to move; 39 percent lived in overcrowded
conditions; and 19 percent said that family members had to live apart
during the past year.'
Until the Fair Housing Amendments took effect in March 1989,
no federal law provided comprehensive protection to families with
children who suffered discrimination in housing.
Numerous Supreme Court decisions extended constitutional
protection to the fundamental right to procreate and raise children,6
but there was little development of that right in housing cases. In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland 7 a sharply divided Supreme Court
held that a zoning ordinance which prohibited an orphaned grandson from living with his grandmother violated due process. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further indicated that refusals to rent to families with children might violate the fundamental
3. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3236.
4. Id.
5. H.R. REP., No. 171, 100th Cong., 2d sess. 19, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2173, 2180 n.33 [hereinafter House Report].
6. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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right to privacy;8 however, the Second Circuit found a university
regulation forbidding children from living in a housing project for
married students to be constitutional.9
Nonetheless, further development of the constitutional right of
families with children to be free from discrimination in housing
would have had limited impact. The first, fifth and fourteenth
amendments, from which such a right is derived, all require governmental action; purely private discrimination cannot be reached directly under these amendments. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
had held that the mere fact that a private home receives governmental funds does not create a sufficient nexus to convert the private
action into governmental action.' 0 Therefore, although development
of the constitutional right would have been helpful in cases where
government action was involved, such as in exclusionary zoning or in
public housing cases, it would not have been helpful in reaching private discrimination. In addition, because a fourteenth amendment
violation, unlike a violation of the Fair Housing Act, requires proof
of "purposeful" discrimination, the Fair Housing remedy is decidedly preferable to the constitutional remedy in combating more subtle forms of discrimination."
Discrimination against families with children can have a disparate impact on the availability of housing for racial or ethnic groups,
especially for blacks and hispanics who are more likely to have children. "' In addressing the need for the new amendments, Senator
Dominici cited a HUD study that found that:
Units in predominantly white neighborhoods restricted children at a
rate of 28.9 percent compared with 17.5 percent in predominantly
black neighborhoods, and also found that restrictions are greater in
recently built units.'8
Where adult-only requirements operated to exclude minorities from
rental housing, courts had previously found that an action could be
maintained under the prohibitions against racial discrimination in
the Fair Housing Act;' however, with the new amendments, fair
housing advocates can have these requirements invalidated without
proof of such a racially discriminatory impact.
8. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
9. Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
11. Compare Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (Equal Protection) with Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977), (Fair Housing Act), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1025 (1978).
12. House Report, supra note 5, at 21.
13. CONG. REC. S10553 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988).
14. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Association, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Halet v.
Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
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At the time Congress considered the Fair Housing Amendments
in 1988, sixteen states had laws prohibiting discrimination against
children in housing."5 Congress was not satisfied, however, that these
laws provided sufficient protection to families with children. Many
of these laws contained broad exemptions from coverage, and the
House Report cited studies that showed that even in those states
that had broad coverage, discrimination against children continued
to be a serious problem." The House Report further stated that in
those states without laws prohibiting discrimination, the situation
7
was equally serious.
The Fair Housing Act now puts the machinery of the federal
government behind eliminating discrimination against families with
children; and federal enforcement should send a strong message to
the public that people with children are entitled to housing the same
as everyone else, and on the same terms.
B. Coverage
The new amendments broadly define the categories of persons
included in the protection given families with children. A "family"
may consist of only a single individual. 8 "Familial status" means
one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years)
who are domiciled with a parent or a person having legal custody of
the individual or who are domiciled with a person designated by the
parent or other person having such custody, with the written permission of such parent or other person."9 "Familial status" also extends to any person who is pregnant or who is in the process of securing legal custody of an individual who has not attained the age of
18 years.20
While the new amendments do not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of marital status,21 they clearly prohibit discrimination
against single parents or those who have a child born out of wedlock.22 They also clearly prohibit discrimination against single fa15.

House Report, supra note 5, at 19.

16. Id. at 20.
17. Id.
18. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619) [hereinafter 1988 Act]. This Act
amends the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619 (1982).

19.
20.
21.
22.

1988 Act, supra note 18, §802(k), at 1620.
Id.
House Report, supra note 5, at 23.
Cf. Thomas v. Housing Authority of Little Rock, 282 F. Supp 575 (E.D. Ark.

1987) (holding that a public housing project cannot automatically exclude or evict a

low income family or a member thereof on the grounds that a member of the family
has had a child born out of wedlock). See also McKenna v. Peekskill Housing Authority, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981); Atkinston v. Kern City Housing Authority, 59
Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
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thers, as well as single mothers, who have custody of their children."2
The new Act states that reasonable local, state, or federal regulations on the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling are lawful."' The HUD regulations explain that reasonable
governmental limitations on occupancy can continue as long as they
are applied to all occupants and do not discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.25 Significantly missing from this section is any mention of restrictions placed upon the number of occupants by private landlords
or by private developers or property managers; therefore, the clear
language of the Act is to make such restrictions unlawful.
A number of commenters asked HUD to develop an occupancy
standard that private owners or managers could use in the absence
of a state or local occupancy code. Alternatively, the commenters
asked HUD to promulgate a rule to enable owners and managers of
rental housing to be considered to be in compliance with the Act if
they implemented occupancy standards no less stringent than those
currently used in connection with HUD-assisted housing programs.2"
HUD refused to promulgate such rules on the ground that the legislative history of the Act showed opposition to the development of a
national occupancy code.2 7 HUD did acknowledge that owners or
managers could develop and implement reasonable occupancy requirements based on factors such as the size and number of sleeping
areas or bedrooms, and the overall size of the dwelling unit. HUD
emphasized, however, that it would carefully examine any such nongovernmental restriction to determine whether it operated to unreasonably limit or exclude families with children.2" In light of the express intent of the Act to open up housing to families with children
and the absence of any mention of private occupancy rules, the burden should be placed on the owner or manager to show that the
standard does not unreasonably restrict housing for families with
children. Any doubt should be resolved against the landlord.29
The amendments specifically exempt "housing for older persons" from the prohibitions against familial discrimination. While
Congress intended to open the housing doors in America for families
with children, it did not intend to do so at the expense of older
23. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)(holding that the custody rights of
an unmarried father cannot be severed without proof that he is unfit).
24. 1988 Act, supra note 18, § 807(b), at 1623.
25. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3237.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Such a result was recently imposed in Chicago where the federal district
court ordered mediation where a landlord refused to consider a family's housing application because of the children. Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at 7, col.4.
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Americans who may have special housing needs."0 "Housing for
older persons" under the Act is of three different types:
A) Housing provided under any State or Federal program specifically
designed and operated to assist the elderly, as defined in the particular program;
B) Housing intended for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years or
older;
C) Housing intended and occupied by at least one person 55 years of
age or older and which meets certain regulations promulgated by
HUD which require (1) the existence of "significant facilities and services" designed for the physical and social needs of older persons, (2)
at least 80% of the units to be occupied by at least one person 55
years or older, and (3) the publication and adherence to policies demonstrating an intent to provide housing to persons 55 years or older. 3,
The Act also has a grandfather clause that provides that as to
categories B and C, housing will qualify even if there are persons in
the units as of the date of the enactment of the Act who do not meet
the age requirements, or if there are unoccupied units, so long as
new occupants are required to meet the age requirements of these
sections.32 Senator Kennedy explained that this clause was inserted
in the Act so as not to impose liability on any elderly housing due to
pre-existing age restrictions which were lower than those in the Act
and which were recorded prior to its enactment and so long as these
pre-existing age restrictions are not enforced in a manner inconsistent with the Act."
The Senate debate makes clear that mobile home parks are eligible for the same exemptions as other "housing for older persons." 4
The HUD regulations state that as to sixty-two or over housing,
all persons must meet the sixty-two or over requirement, including
the spouses of those sixty-two or over.3 5 However, units can be occupied in sixty-two or over housing by employees who are under sixtytwo and who perform substantial duties directly related to the management or maintenance of the housing.36 Thus, housekeepers who
are under the age of sixty-two could be allowed to occupy units in
the sixty-two and over community. The rules do not state that
nurses would qualify for this exemption, and one could argue that
they are not related to the management or maintenance of the housing as such. However, persons over sixty-two sometimes require fulltime nursing, and a case could be made that Congress did not intend
30. 134 CONG. REC. S10552 (daily'ed. Aug. 2, 1988)(remarks of Senator
Dominici).
31. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §807(b)(2), at 1623.
32. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §807(b)(3), at 1623.
33. 134 CONG. REC. S10549 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988).
34. 134 CONG. REC. S10551 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988).
35. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, §100.303, at 3290.
36. Id., §100.303(a)(3), at 3290.
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to exclude qualified nurses or nurse's aides who are under the age of
sixty-two but might be required to live in the sixty-two or older
community to take care of patients.
The regulations also state what will qualify as "significant facilities and services" in fifty-five or older housing. These facilities and
services may include social and recreational programs, educational
programs, homemaker services, an accessible physical environment,
emergency and preventive health care, congregate dining facilities,
and transportation,3 7 so long as they are "significant. 38 If it is not
practicable to provide "significant facilities and services," housing
may still qualify if it is necessary to provide important housing opportunities to the elderly. 9 To meet this latter exception, the owner
or manager must demonstrate "through credible and objective evidence [as spelled out in the regulations] that the provision of significant facilities and services designed to meet the physical or social
needs of older persons would result in depriving older persons in the
relevant geographical area of needed and desired housing."40 Some
commenters had suggested that HUD establish a "precertification"
procedure to establish that a facility meets the requirements of the
Act, but HUD decided it would be premature to do so at the time. "1
C. Application
The protection given to families with children under the new
amendments is comprehensive, and the Act and regulations promulgated by HUD leave little doubt that exemptions will be carefully
scrutinized. Zoning restrictions that have the effect of excluding
families with children are clearly illegal under the new amendments,
unless they are for the purpose of establishing communities for the
elderly that meet the requirements of Section 807(b)(2).' 2 The Act
allows states and local governments to set reasonable restrictions on
the maximum number of occupants of a dwelling," but the HUD
regulations state that this power cannot be used to discriminate
against families with children."
The new amendments clearly prohibit the type of zoning found
offensive under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
37. Id., §100.304(b)(1), at 3290.
38. Id., at 3256. The comments indicate that merely installing a ramp at the
front entrance of a housing facility or putting a couch in a laundry room and labeling
it a recreation area will not be considered "significant."
39. Id., §100.304(b)(2), at 3290-91.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 3256.
42. 1988 Act, supra note 18, § 807(b)(2), at 1623.
43. Id. § 807(b)(1), at 1623.
44. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3237.
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by the Supreme Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.4 ' The
East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy to members of a single
family, but recognized as a "family" only a few categories of related
individuals. The ordinance prohibited a woman from living with her
son and her two grandsons, who were cousins rather than brothers.
The ordinance's narrow description of a "family" conflicts with the
broader protection given to "familial status" in Section 802(k) of the
new Act.'
The occupancy restrictions upheld under a due process analysis
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas7 may also be invalid under the
new Act. The ordinance restricted land use to one-family dwellings.
"Families" included one or more persons related by "blood, adoption, or marriage." Two persons who lived and cooked together as a
single housekeeping unit, though not related by blood, adoption or
marriage, were also included in the definition of "family" under the
ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional because it prohibited six unrelated, adult college students from living together. Similarly, the six adult, unrelated college
students would not qualify for "familial status" under the Fair
Housing Act. However, the ordinance could prohibit a family consisting of several unrelated foster children or several unrelated children who are residing with a person with the written permission of
their parents, and in such a case, the ordinance would violate the
Act.
The Fair Housing Amendments may invalidate zoning rules
that prohibit the building of multi-family dwellings if the purpose or
effect is to discriminate against families with children. HUD has
made clear that restrictions preventing families with children from
obtaining housing are to be judged under the same standards as
those applying to exclusions based on race.48 Zoning restrictions that
have the impact of denying housing opportunities to a minority
home seeker in a discriminatory manner have been held to violate
9
the Fair Housing Act.'
In considering whether a rezoning denial for a multi-family project had a racially discriminatory impact in violation of the Fair
Housing Act, in Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington
45. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. 1988 Act, supra note 18, § 804(c), (d), and (e), at 1622.
47. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
48. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3236.
49. See, e.g., Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). See
also Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (appellants conceded applicability of impact test and the Supreme Court was satisfied

that the record showed a disparate impact).
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Heights," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit identified
four critical factors:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to
satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis [426 U.S.
229 (1975)]; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action
complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant
to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or
merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual
property owners who wish to provide such housing."
The court of appeals identified two kinds of effects that a racially
neutral decision about housing can produce. The first occurs where
the decision has a greater impact on one racial group than on another. The second refers to the impact on the community itself. It
was the second kind of effect - where the zoning decision would necessarily perpetuate racially segregated housing - that the court of
appeals found to be determinative in Arlington Heights.2 The court
found a discriminatory effect because the village was "overwhelmingly white" and because the construction of a multi-family project
would have been "a significant step toward integrating the

community.

''

15

Families with children, which are excluded because of restrictive zoning ordinances, may also argue that the new amendments
should be applied whenever a municipality fails to provide a "reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing . . .to meet the needs, desires and resources"' of families with
children. This argument is based upon the famous Mount Laurel
decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court that interpret the New
Jersey Constitution.5 5 The Mount Laurel decisions protect low in50. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 1290.
52. Id. at 1290-91.
53. Id. at 1291.
54. South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 179, 336 A.2d 713, 728 (1975).
55. In Mount Laurel, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a municipality could not enact restrictive land use policies that make it physically or economically impossible for low income housing to be built within its limits. The court held
such restrictions to violate the New Jersey Constitution regardless of the intent of the
municipality. In so holding the court recognized that "there cannot be the slightest
doubt that shelter, along with food, are [sic] the most basic human needs." 67 N.J. at
178, 336 A.2d at 727.
The New Jersey Supreme Court re-examined its Mount Laurel opinion and expanded it in South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). See also N.Y. Times, Jan 22, 1983, at 9, col. 1. The court
framed its order in affirmative rather than in negative terms. The court held that all
municipalities have a positive legal duty to provide a realistic opportunity for the
construction of their numerical fair share of the region's lower income housing need
as determined by the state development guide plan. The opinion specified precisely
how this objective is to be accomplished and the role the courts should play in effect-
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come persons, a category not protected by the Fair Housing Act.
However, the Fair Housing Act does protect families with children
and the Mount Laurel decisions may be helpful in framing an argument that municipal zoning restrictions may not be used to exclude
families with children." Even if the courts refuse to accept the
Mount Laurel affirmative obligation analogy, if one can show some
evidence of a discriminatory intent to exclude families or a strong
case of a discriminatory impact, as in Arlington Heights, the zoning
57
restrictions will be illegal under the Act.
Another question directly addressed in the regulations is
whether families with children can be restricted from the upper
floors in high-rise buildings. Commenters argued that allowing children to occupy upper floors of high-rises could result in increased

tort liability.58 HUD has ruled, however, that while landlords or

building managers can pass reasonable health and safety regulations, they cannot exclude families with children from the upper
floors of a high-rise based on the assertion that there is a per se risk
to health or safety.59 Commenters also pointed to Section 201 of the
Housing and Community Development Act,"0 which directed HUD
to "prohibit high-rise elevator projects for families with children unless there is no practical alternative." However, HUD concluded
that Congress did not intend to limit the ability of families to rent
high-rise units, nor did it think that the Housing and Community
Development Act supported an exemption under the Fair Housing
Act.
Similar concerns apply to one-room efficiency apartments. The
HUD comments state that construction of a building with small
units will not itself violate the Act, but refusals to rent units to faming this objective.
Finally, in 1985, in response to the two Mount Laurel opinions, the New Jersey
legislature enacted a new Fair Housing Code (N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:27D-301-29 (West
1986 & Supp. 1988)), that also established a Council on Affordable Housing. The Act
allowed suburban areas to transfer half of their housing obligation to a city, which
would receive payment to help it build low-income housing there rather than in the
suburbs. The Act instituted comprehensive state-wide planning and charged the
Council with determining the need for lower-income housing, the regional proportion
of that need, and the standards for allocating to each community its fair share. The
Act effectively transferred the determination of whether the Mount Laurel standards
were satisfied from the courts to the Council. The constitutionality of the Act was
upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Hills Development Co. v. Bernards, 103
N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986). See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, at §8, p.1, col.2, for an
analysis of progress made in New Jersey under the Mount Laurel doctrine.
56. See generally Anderson & Steinhoff, Housing for DisabledPersons: A Case
Waiting to Happen, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 578 (Nov. 1987).
57. This analysis would, of course, fail in communities for the elderly. See 1988
Act, supra note 18, §807 (b)(2), at 1623.
58. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3236.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(c)(1) (1982).
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ilies with children will be considered on an individual basis."'
Nothing in the Act or regulations requires landlords or communities to provide special facilities or recreational areas for children.
Also, nothing in the Act prohibits non-discriminatory noise or property damage regulations. A landlord or manager cannot refuse a
dwelling to a family with children, however, based on the assumption that children ordinarily cause damage to property or make
noise. The HUD comments do state that a housing provider can
consider for all applicants such concerns as past rental history, violations of rules and laws, or a history of disruptive, abusive, or dangerous behavior."' Decisions may not be made on the basis of overbroad stereotypes.
Similarly, a landlord or building manager may not require special security deposits for families with children. This would conflict
with Congress' intent to provide the same protection to families
with children as to other classes. 3 HUD has also stated that it will
determine on a case by case basis whether charges for the provision
of water, electricity, refuse collection, and other services, based on
the number of persons
who occupy a unit, discriminate against fami64
lies with children.

II.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HANDICAPPED

A. History of and the Need for Federal Legislation
Handicapped persons, like so many other discrete and insular
minorities, began a major push for civil rights in the early 1970's.
The movement resulted in the passage of a number of state and federal laws protecting the handicapped, the most important being the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."' Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits federal contractors from discriminating against the handicapped,66 and Section 504 forbids discrimination against the handicapped in any program receiving federal money.6"
Despite Congressional efforts to protect the handicapped, handicapped persons have not fared particularly well with the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that for purposes of equal protection analysis mentally retarded persons are not
a suspect class. Hence, legislation specially affecting the retarded
61. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3239.
62. Id. at 3245 (referring particularly to handicapped applicants but emphasizing the word "all").
63. Id. at 3239.

64. Id.
65.

29 U.S.C. §§790-796 (1982).

66. Id. § 793.
67. Id. § 794.
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will be presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.68
The Supreme Court has narrowly construed legislation which
Congress passed intending to benefit handicapped individuals. In
6 9 the Court held
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,
that the
"bill of rights" provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 70 which provides that "persons with
developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and rehabilitation for such disabilities," does not create any
substantive rights enforceable in the courts. Similarly, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,1 the Court held that Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act did not impose any requirement on an
educational institution to lower or substantially modify its standards
to accommodate a handicapped person.7 2 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,7 the Court held that the Rehabilitation Act did
not abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity, and refused
to allow an individual to sue a state hospital which denied him employment solely because of his physical handicap.74 In Bowen v.
American Hospital Association,75 the Supreme Court held that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not authorize the Department
of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations prohibiting the withholding of nourishment and medically beneficial treatment from newborn handicapped infants.
On the positive side, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline'7 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 504 broadly. The
Court held that an individual with an impairment resulting from the
68. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985). In
the criminal justice area, the Supreme Court has held that mentally ill persons need
not be accorded any greater protections than those accorded the general public to
determine the voluntariness of their confessions. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515,
519-22(1986).
69. 451 U.S. 1, 18-27 (1981).
70. 42 U.S.C. §6010(1) (1982).
71. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
72. In Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the
Education of Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C., §1415(e)(3) (1982), prohibited a school
from excluding a handicapped child based on his disruptive or dangerous behavior.
73. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Congress changed this result by passing the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986. 29 U.S.C. §701(1982)..
74. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), the Court, while
leaving open the question of whether the Rehabilitation Act creates a private right of
action, did hold that a suit could be maintained against an employer even if the federal funds he received were not primarily intended to promote employment. However,
in Dep't of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986),
the United States Supreme Court held that an airline could not be sued for discrimination under § 504 because it benefited only indirectly from funds given by the federal government to airport authorities used by the airline.
75. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
76. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
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contagious disease of tuberculosis was "otherwise qualified" for employment based upon reasonable medical judgments that the disease
was not easily transmitted, and that the employer could easily accommodate the employee."
In 1980, the House of Representatives voted to extend the Fair
Housing Act to protect handicapped persons, but the bill failed to
pass the Senate. 8 The 1988 Amendments use the same definitions
and concepts from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to protect handicapped persons from discrimination in housing.7 s Therefore, there is
an already established body of law to aid in interpreting these
Amendments. The House Report on the 1988 Amendments states
that:
The Fair Housing Amendments Act, like Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is a clear pronouncement of a national
commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be
considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities
and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are specifically
rejected as grounds to justify exclusion. 80
As with families with children, Congress found that widespread
stereotyping of persons with handicaps resulted in their frequent exclusion from housing. The House Report noted that:
For example, people who use wheelchairs have been denied the
right to build simple ramps to provide access, or have been perceived
as posing some threat to property maintenance. People with visual
and hearing impairments have been perceived as dangers because of
erroneous beliefs about their abilities. People with mental retardation
have been excluded because of stereotypes about their capacity to live
safely and independently. People with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) and people who test positive for the AIDS virus
have been evicted because of an erroneous belief that they pose a
health risk to others.8'
B.

Coverage

The Fair Housing Amendments adopt the same definition of a
77. However, in Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988), the Supreme Court
held 'that, despite Section 504, it was not unlawful for the Veteran's Administration
to create a conclusive presumption that alcoholism not motivated by mental illness is
necessarily "willful" and therefore to cut off benefits to a veteran who claimed he was
disabled by alcoholism.
78. House Report, supra note 5, at 14.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 18. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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handicapped person as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.82 "Handicap"
with respect to a person means:
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities; (2) a record of having such
an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802))." s
Coverage under the Act is broad. It is unlawful to refuse to rent
or sell housing not only when the buyer or renter himself is handicapped, but also when a person residing in or intending to reside in
the home is handicapped, and also when any person associated with
the buyer or renter is handicapped."4 Thus, for instance, it is unlawful to refuse to rent to a tenant because he or she has a mentally
retarded relative, who will not live with the tenant, but who may
visit the tenant from time to time.
The Act protects not only those persons who have a physical or
mental handicap or who have a history of having such a handicap,
but also those persons who are perceived to have such a handicap.
Thus a landlord who refused to rent to someone because he "regarded" him as being mentally retarded, or a landlord who refused
to rent to a gay man because he thought he might have AIDS, would
be in violation of the Act.8"
The Act not only protects persons who are regarded as having
AIDS but also those actually infected with the AIDS virus (HIV)."8
The Act thus parallels the provision added to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 19887 and is in accord with the Supreme Court's
decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,88 which holds
82. 29 U.S.C. §706 (8)(b)(1982).
83. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §802(h), at 1619.
84. Id. §804(f), at 1620.
85. See Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 979 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1984)
(school "regarded" certain students as retarded when they claimed not to be); Carter
v. Orleans Parish Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1984) (same). Discrimination based on sexual preference as such is not prohibited by the Act. 1988 Act, supra
note 18, at 1622.
86. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, P.L. 100-259, 1029 Stat. 28 (1987)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §706).
87. Senator Cranston emphasized that the new amendments protect persons
with all AIDS-related conditions, including AIDS, AIDS-related complex, and asymptomatic infection with the AIDS virus unless the health or safety of another is directly threatened. 134 CONG. REC. S10557 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988). In June of 1989,
the American Civil Liberties Union filed a suit on behalf of Charles Baxter against
the City of Belleville, Illinois. The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, June 14, 1989, at 3,
col. 5. Mr. Baxter wants to open "Our Place," a shelter to house up to seven Aids
patients. Id. Reportedly, the City Council voted to deny Mr. Baxter's request to open
the house "because of concerns about the transmission of the disease and the location
of the home, which is across from a school." Id.
88. 107 S.Ct. 123, 1130 (1987).
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that "the fact that a person with a record of a physical impairment
is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from coverage under §504."
The Supreme Court also stated in Arline, however, that "[a]
person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for
his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that
risk." ' The House Report states that the same standard is to be
applied in the context of housing.9 0 A landlord must establish that
there is a nexus between the fact of the individual's tenancy and a
direct threat and significant risk of harm to the health or safety of
others. If a reasonable accommodation will eliminate the risk, then
the landlord must engage in such an accommodation."
The Act specifically requires a landlord or seller to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped persons] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."92
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what is a "reasonable
accommodation" in an educational setting in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.93 Southeastern was an action under Section
504, brought against a college by a licensed practical nurse who, because of a hearing disability, was denied admission into the college's
nursing program. The Court found that good hearing was a necessary qualification for being a nurse and that the college's refusal to
make "major adjustments" in its nursing program did not constitute
discrimination. The Court noted, however, that refusals to modify
an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory
where the modifications would not impose "undue financial and administrative burdens. ' ' 94 Similarly, in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,95 the Supreme Court held that an airline did not engage in
illegal religious discrimination for failing to accommodate the schedule of an employee who refused to work on Saturdays. The airline
had first permitted the steward to seek a swap of shifts or days off,
but no other employees were willing to accommodate him and the
union seniority system made an involuntary shift impossible. The
Court found that the airline had made a reasonable effort to accommodate. It noted that an employer could not be expected to accommodate one employee by violating the contractual rights of other
89.

Id.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

House Report supra note 5, at 29.
Id.
1988 Act, supra note 18, §804(f)(3)(b), at 1621.
442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Id. at 412-13. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-1 (1985).
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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employees.96 Other alternatives, such as allowing the employee a
four-day work week, or replacing him on weekends with other available employees, would have involved costs to the airline, either in
9
the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or in higher wages. 7
These cases indicate that the Supreme Court is not likely to
interpret "reasonable accommodation" so as to impose major costs
or administrative burdens on landlords or sellers. This interpretation is reflected in the implementing regulations adopted by HUD.
HUD noted that:
A number of commenters were concerned that this language [reasonable accommodation] could be interpreted as requiring that housing
providers provide a broad range of services to persons with handicaps
that the housing provider does not normally provide as part of its
housing. The Department wishes to stress that a housing provider is
not required to provide supportive services, e.g., counseling, medical,
or social services that fall outside the scope of the services that the
housing provider offers to residents. A housing provider is required to
make modifications in order to enable a qualified applicant with
handicaps to live in the housing, but is not required to offer housing
of a fundamentally different nature. The test is whether, with appropriate modifications, the applicant can live in the housing that the
housing provider offers; not whether the applicant could benefit from
some other type of housing that the housing provider does not offer. 8
Examples provided by HUD where a "reasonable accommodation" must be made are where a blind person need- to live in a
dwelling with a seeing eye dog or where a parking space can be arranged so as to accommodate someone whose mobility is impaired."
A rare case dealing with what constitutes a reasonable accommodation in a housing case is Schuett Investment Co. v. Anderson. 00 A landlord of a federally subsidized housing project brought
an action to terminate a tenant's lease "for cause." The landlord
claimed that she had accumulated boxes of papers in her apartment
which constituted a fire hazard. The tenant argued that she had a
back injury which prevented her from moving the boxes and that
the landlord had failed to accommodate her by having its employees
help her to get rid of the boxes. After the eviction action was filed,
she did have some children remove the boxes. The trial court found
that the tenant was handicapped and that the landlord could have
taken modest affirmative steps without undue hardship on its operations to reasonably accommodate her. The court of appeals held that
96.
97.
98.
99.
Ga., 652
100.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 84.
Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3249.
Id. §100-204, at 3289. Cf. Majors v. Housing Authority of County of DeKalb,
F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981)(seeing eye dog).
386 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. App. Ct. 1986).
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this ruling was not clearly erroneous.
Even if an accommodation would be costly or burdensome, Section 804(f)(3)(A) states that a landlord or seller cannot refuse "to
permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such
person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person
full enjoyment of the premises[;]''
Stereotypes about retarded persons or about those who are
mentally ill will not be tolerated under the new Act. In City of
0 2
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,1
the Supreme Court held that
the city's refusal to grant a zoning variance to permit the construction of a group home for the mentally retarded violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The city first argued that it was concerned with the negative attitude of property
owners and especially with the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood. But the Court held that this was not a permissible
basis for treating a home for the mentally retarded different from
other homes.'0 3 The Court also rejected as valid concerns the arguments that: the home would be across from a junior high school and
the students might harass the residents; that the site was on a "five
hundred year flood plain," when other group homes were allowed to
be built on the same site; and that the home might be overcrowded,
although the home met the occupancy standards for other dwellings. 104 These, or similar justifications, will fare no better under the
Fair Housing Act than they did under the fourteenth amendment.
A landlord may ask a retarded person or a person who is mentally ill for references, as he would for any other occupant.'
He
may consider for all applicants past rental history, violations of
rules and laws, and a history of disruptive, abusive or dangerous behavior.106 However, he cannot infer that a recent history of mental
illness constitutes proof that an applicant will be unable to fulfill his
or her tenancy obligations. 07
Alcoholism will frequently qualify as a "handicap" under the
Fair Housing Act.' 08 However, alcoholics can be required to meet the
101. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §804(f)(3)(A), at 1620. The section does allow a
landlord, where it is reasonable, to require that the renter agree to restore the interior
of the premises to the condition that existed before the modifications, reasonable
wear and tear excepted.
102. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
103. Id. at 478.
104. Id. at 449-50.
105. House Report, supra note 5, at 30.
106. 54 Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3245.
107. House Report, supra note 5, at 30.
108. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3245. But cf., Traynor v.
Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988), which allows the Veteran's Administration to dis-
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same behavior standards as are applied to others, even if the behavior problem stems directly from the alcoholism." 9 The alcoholic's
past history of disruptive behavior may also be considered in denying him or her a dwelling. "
Current illegal users of or addicts of controlled substances, as
defined by the Controlled Substances Act, 1" are not protected by
the new amendments. Landlords or sellers can properly inquire into
illegal use of drugs and can reject applicants or buyers on that
basis."
C. Application
Purposeful discrimination against handicapped persons is definitely prohibited under the new amendments. As in the case of familial status discrimination, requiring handicapped tenants to post
special security deposits," 3 excluding them from the top floors of
high rises,"" or requiring them to meet special application procedures" 5 is illegal under the new amendments.
Also, decisions having a discriminatory impact on handicapped
persons may violate the Act. In Alexander v.Choate,"' the United
States Supreme Court considered whether actions which have a discriminatory impact may violate Section 504. The Court held that a
state's reduction from ten to fourteen of the number of in-patient
hospital days that would be paid for by medicaid did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, despite the fact that the reduction had a
disproportionate impact on handicapped individuals.
The Supreme Court rejected the state's argument that the Rehabilitation Act only proscribed intentional discrimination against
the handicapped." 7 It noted that "[d]iscrimination against the
handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect.""' Also, the Court noted the pragmatic reason that "much of the conduct Congress sought to alter in
passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to
reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a
criminate against alcoholics who are not also mentally ill.
109. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3245.

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.

21 U.S.C. §802 (1982).
House Report, supra note 5, at 30.
Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3239.
Id. at 3236.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 3245.
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
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discriminatory intent."'1' Nonetheless, the Court found that to interpret Section 504 to reach all action that has a disparate impact
on the handicapped would also be troubling because the handicapped are typically not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped. 2 0
Trying to keep both of these considerations within manageable
bounds, the Supreme Court held that at least some conduct that has
a disparate impact upon the handicapped is forbidden by Section
504.121 The Court relied on Southeastern Community College v.
22

Davis:1

Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of
federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs: while a
grantee need not be required to make "fundamental" or "substantial"
modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to
make "reasonable" ones....
The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to
the benefit that the grantee offers. The benefit itself, of course, cannot
be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled;
to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations
in the
23
grantee's program or benefit may have to be made.'
The Court upheld the Medicare restriction because the state provided equal coverage to both handicapped and non-handicapped
persons. The state was not required to provide handicapped persons
with more coverage than non-handicapped persons.2
Under the Fair Housing Act, while not every decision that has a
disproportionate adverse effect on handicapped persons will violate
the Act, decisions that operate to deny the handicapped equal access
to housing will be illegal. The House Report adopts this understanding of the new amendments:
Another method of making housing unavailable to people with disabilities has been the application or enforcement of otherwise neutral
rules and regulations on health, safety and land-use in a manner
which discriminates against people with disabilities. Such discrimination often results from false or over-protective assumptions about the
needs of handicapped people, as well as unfounded fears of difficulties
about the problems that their tenancies may pose. These and similar
practices would be prohibited." '
119. Id. at 296-97.
120. Id. at 298.
121. Id. at 299. For a further discussion of disparate impact see, supra notes 4953 and accompanying text.
122. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
123. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300-1.
124. Id. at 309.
125. House Report, supra note 5, at 24. The Report cites as an example City of
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Zoning decisions that have the purpose or effect of excluding
handicapped persons will violate the Act. The House Report specifically notes that:
These new subsections would also apply to state or local land use and
health and safety laws, regulations, practices or decisions which discriminate against individuals with handicaps. While state and local
governments have authority to protect safety and health, and to regulate use of land, that authority has sometimes been used to restrict
the ability of individuals with handicaps to live in communities. This
has been accomplished by such means as the enactment or imposition
of health, safety or land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements among non-related persons with disabilities. Since these
requirements are not imposed on families and groups of similar size of
other unrelated people, these requirements have the effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities.
The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination against those with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and
conditional or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the
ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in
the community. Under H.R. 1158, land use and zoning cases are to be
litigated in court by the Department
126 of Justice. They would not go
through the administrative process.
The HUD regulations do not expressly address the issue of zoning
because individual cases are to be referred to the Justice Depart27
ment rather than resolved by HUD.1

Municipalities should not be able to rely upon Section
807(b) (1)1. of the new Act, which permits regulations concerning
the number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling, to justify
discriminatory zoning regulations. HUD has made clear that such
regulations are lawful only so long as they are equally applied to all
occupants and do not discriminate on the basis of handicap. 29
Advocates for the handicapped should also argue the Mount
Laurel cases120 to establish that municipalities cannot pass zoning
laws that have the effect of denying housing to the handicapped.
The argument that a community can zone out group homes and
other facilities that serve the handicapped, under the guise that
these people can go elsewhere, is clearly counter to the Congressional intent to protect this class of individuals.'
A clear example of what should be held to violate the new
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 435 (1985).
126. House Report, supra note 5, at 24.

127. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3246.
128. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §807(b)(1), at 1623.

129. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 5 at 3237.
130. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
131. See House Report, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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amendments is provided by the City of Chicago Heights, Illinois. A
private company asked that city for a special use permit to build a
home for fifteen mentally retarded persons in a district zoned for
two-family residences. Some 330 persons petitioned against the permit, and local residents were quoted as being fearful about the
problems a home for the mentally retarded would create in their
community."3 2 Meetings concerning the permit were described as
"heated.""13 The city's corporation counsel was quoted as stating
that uses allowed by special permit include "rest homes, nursing
homes, hospitals and sanitariums," as well as "institutions for the
aged and for children" or "schools-day or nursery, public or private." 1 3 ' He did not, however, see a home for the mentally disabled
as being comparable to any of these.13 5 The zoning board finally denied the request on the ground that a home for retarded adults did
not qualify as a nursing home, hospital, nursery school, or institution for the aged or children under the zoning code.13 6
Institutions such as nursing homes attempting to exclude the
handicapped raises a serious question under Section 804(f) of the
Act. Nursing or other group homes are clearly "dwellings" which are
"occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence
by one or more families. 1 3 7 One can argue that Section 807(b)(1)
exempts "housing for older persons" from the prohibitions against
"familial status" discrimination but not against discrimination
against the handicapped, and therefore, "housing for older persons"
cannot exclude handicapped persons. If a handicapped person is excluded because of a neutral age restriction and not because of his or
her handicap per se, however, there is no violation of the Act be132. The Chicago Heights Star, Feb. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 2, and April 9, 1989, at
1, col. 5.
133. The Chicago Heights Star, April 2, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The Chicago Heights Star, April 9, 1989, at 1 col. 5. The Chicago Heights
City Council subsequently accepted the recommendation of the zoning board. In explaining the decision, the mayor stated that, "The Zoning board did not turn this
down because of mentally retarded people ... Anyone asking for 15 people living in
one house in that neighborhood would be turned down by the Zoning Board." The
Chicago Heights Star, May 4, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
In June of 1989, the United States Justice Department filed suit against Chicago
Heights. Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Anton Valukas, the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, said "Filing this action against the city of
Chicago Heights signals the refusal of this office to tolerate discrimination against
individuals or groups based on their status as mentally or physically handicapped."
Id.
137. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §802(b), at 1619. A "Family" may consist of a
single individual. Id. §802(k), at 1620. Dwellings in which the owner lives that are
occupied by no more than four families and dwellings owned by religious organizations or private clubs for their own members' use are excluded under the Act. Id. §
803(b), at 1619.
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cause age classifications are not illegal under the Act.13
A home for the elderly that excludes the elderly who are handicapped would stand on different footing. Exclusion of the elderly
handicapped would appear to be illegal unless the owner could not
"reasonably accommodate" the handicapped individual. This might
be the case if the individual required special nursing care which the
owner would not normally provide and that would be expensive and
administratively burdensome for him to provide.139 A similar argument could be made that a home could not discriminate between
persons with different types of handicaps. Lower courts have interpreted Section 504 to permit homes to admit the mobility impaired
but to exclude the mentally impaired.'4 0 However, the mere act of
differentiation itself without further justification should be held to
be illegal. The owner should be required to make the minimum
showing that he provides particular services for the mobility impaired and cannot "reasonably accommodate" the mentally
impaired.
In some instances, landlords and owners may be required to do
more than "reasonably accommodate" handicapped persons. They
must permit tenants or occupants to make reasonable modifications
to premises at the tenant's own expense. However, a landlord may
require the tenant to restore the premises when the lease is ended if
it is reasonable to do so.141 The regulations permit a landlord to require the tenant to pay into an interest bearing escrow account a
reasonable amount of money over a reasonable period to ensure that
funds will be available for the restoration.1 42 The regulations make
clear that a landlord may not routinely require these escrow payments; he must make a case-by-case determination based upon such
factors as the extent and nature of the modifications, the expected
duration of the lease, and the credit and tenancy history of the
tenant.""
As examples of what are reasonable modifications, the regulations state that a tenant may install grab bars in a bathroom, but
that a landlord can require him to remove them at the end of the
tenancy and to restore the wall to its original condition. It may be
138. Cf. Brecker v. Queens B'nai B'rith Housing Dev., 798 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1986); Knutzer v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.
1987).
139. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of what is a
"reasonable accommodation."
140. See Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1352
(10th Cir. 1987); Dempsey by and through Dempsey v. Ladd, 840 F.2d 638, 641 (9th
Cir. 1987).
141. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §804(f)(3)(A), at 1620.
142. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, §100.203, at 3288.
143. Id. at 3248.
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unreasonable, however, for the landlord to require the tenant to remove the blocking securing the grab bars, as it will not interfere
with a future tenant's use of the bathroom. Also, a tenant may
widen a door for a wheelchair, but under normal circumstances the
landlord cannot insist that the door be narrowed again at the end of
4
14

the lease.

The regulations require the tenant to seek the landlord's approval before the modifications are made and the landlord may require the tenant to give a reasonable description of the modifications as well as reasonable assurances that the work will be done in a
workmanlike manner. If the tenant believes the landlord is unreasonably withholding permission, or is unreasonably
requiring an es5
crow, his remedy is to complain to HUD.'
The Act also requires that covered multifamily dwellings
designed or constructed for first occupancy after March 13, 1991
must meet certain design and construction requirements so as to
make them accessible to handicapped persons. 46 Covered multifamily dwellings are those buildings that consist of four or more dwelling units if the building has one or more elevators, and also "ground
floor" dwelling units in other buildings consisting of four or more
dwelling units. 147 The regulations specify that a building may have
more than one ground floor. 48 HUD has interpreted the Act to
cover single-story townhouses where there are four or more units.
The Act also covers more-than-one story townhouses if they have
elevators and there are four or more units. If a multi-floor
townhouse does not have an elevator, the entire townhouse is exempt so that the "ground floor" does not have to meet the March,
1991 accessibility standards. 4 9
These standards state that at least one building entrance in a
covered building must be on an accessible route, unless it is impractical because of the terrain or unusual characteristics of the building
site.1"' The burden is on the designer or builder to establish the impracticality. 5 If a building has more than one floor on an accessible
route, then the units on each floor with an accessible route must
144. Id. §100.203(c), at 3289.
145. Id. at 3249.
146. 1988 Act, supra note 18, § 804(f)(3)(c), at 1621. The House Report notes
that "readily accessible and usable by" are terms of art used in other statutes and
regulations and that these terms are to be given the same meaning in the Fair Housing Act. E.g., Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§4151-4157; Dept. of
Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. §84.12.
147. 1988 Act, supra note 18, §804(f)(7), at 1622.
148. Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, at 3244.
149. Id.
150. Id. §100.205(a), at 3289.
151. Id.
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satisfy the Act's accessibility requirements.1 5 2
The Act requires not only that the covered dwelling units be
accessible but that public use and common use areas also be accessible.1" HUD's examples of common use areas include: hallways,
lounges, lobbies, laundry rooms, refuse rooms, mail rooms, recrea154
tional areas, and passageways among and between buildings.
Doors must be sufficiently wide to allow passage by handicapped
persons in wheelchairs. 55 Also, light switches, electrical outlets,
thermostats and other environmental controls must be within easy
reach, bathroom walls must be reinforced to allow the installation of
grab bars, and kitchens and bathrooms must have sufficient space to
allow a person in a wheelchair to maneuver. 56
Compliance with the American National Standard requirements
will satisfy the latter requirements, 5 ' provided they also satisfy
state and local standards."' However, the regulations make clear
that the determination of compliance or non-compliance with state
or local requirements is not conclusive of compliance with the federal standards.'59
A major concern of Congress when enacting the design and construction requirements was cost. For instance, in opposing the
amendments, Senator Symms argued that the requirements "will inescapably increase the cost of multifamily rental housing in this
country."' 60 However, Senator Weicker noted that:
Yet the expense associated with accessibility features for new housing
are relatively small. Estimates are that at most, such requirements
would entail less than 1 percent of construction costs. We are told by
the National Association of Home Builders that they can build in features to ensure accessibility at very little cost-and that cost can be
expected to decline even further once such modifications become standard in the housing industry.'0 '
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not intend to establish a national building code.162 HUD may encourage,
but not require, states and local governments to enforce design and
construction requirements that are at least as stringent as the re152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 3244.
1988 Act, supra note 18, §804 (f)(3)(c)(i), at 1621.
Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1 §100.201, at 3287-88.
1988 Act, supra note 18, §804(f)(3)(c)(ii), at 1621.
Id. §804(f)(3)(c)(iii), at 1621.
Id. §804(0(4), at 1621 (commonly cited as ANSI A117.1).
House Report, supra note 5, at 27.
Fair Housing Regulations, supra note 1, §100.205(h), at 3290.
134 Cong. Rec. S10546 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988).

161. Id. at S10552.

162. Id. at S10545 (Statement by Sen. Simpson), S10553 (Statement of Sen.
Weicker).
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quirements in the Act.'" 3 However, HUD is not required to review or
approve the plans, designs, or construction of all covered multifamily dwellings to see whether they conform to the Act."'
III.

LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS

The new amendments to the Fair Housing Act substantially increase the number of persons protected by the Act, but they do not
address the problem faced by many low income persons who are denied access to housing. The amendments address certain forms of
discrimination, but they do not go forward and declare that there is
a right to housing under federal law. As such the Fair Housing Act
will not be of benefit to large numbers of homeless persons or to
those forced to live in substandard housing.
For many poor families, decent housing is unaffordable and unavailable.' 65 Recent studies show that because there is a shortage of
housing for poor persons, poor persons are forced to pay a larger
percentage of their income for housing. Also, one in five poor persons is forced to live in housing classified as substandard by HUD. 6 6
The result is that millions of poor families have been driven into
67
homelessness and many more are threatened by homelessness.1
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone has a right to a standard of living sufficient to enable him
and his family to have housing. 6 In 1944, President Roosevelt declared that it was the right of every family to have a decent home,
and he called upon Congress to explore the means of implementing
this and other economic rights. 6 9 The constitutions of a number of
western-style democracies direct the state to ensure that all citizens
70
have suitable and adequate shelter.1
The United States Supreme Court has refrained from interpreting the Constitution so as to create a right to decent, safe, and sanitary housing.' 7' The Court has also declined to hold that discrimina163.

1988 Act, supra note 18, § 804(f)(5)(c), at 1621.

164. Id. § 804(f)(5)(d), at 1621.
165. See Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary and Proper Aspirations of Fair Housing, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (1989)(published by the National Urban League).
166. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at 14, col. 1.
167. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 1989, §1, at 12, col.l. Compare HUD, A REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS

18-19 (1984), with
(2d

HOMBS & SNYDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA. A FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE, xvi

ed. 1983).
168. United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25(l)(1948).
169. Roosevelt, An Economic Bill of Rights (1944), reprintedin W. LAQUEUR &
R. RUBIN,
170.
171.
Valtierra,

THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 269-70 (1979).

See FED. REPUBLIC OF NIG. CONST., ch. II, §16(2)(d) (1979).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (due process); James v.
402 U.S. 137 (1971) (equal protection).
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tion against poor persons is suspect under equal protection."'
Congress has not included wealth as a prohibited classification
under the Fair Housing Act. Thus, unless a decision can be linked to
one of the prohibited categories under the Act, landlords are free to
discriminate against poor persons 17s and municipalities may pass
zoning regulations that effectively exclude low income families. 17'
By expanding the groups who can claim protection under the
Fair Housing Act to families with children and to the handicapped,
Congress has taken a giant step forward in insuring that decent,
safe, and sanitary housing is available to all persons in the United
States. Housing advocates cannot rest, however, until Congress or
the courts go further and declare that decent, safe, and sanitary
housing is the right of every person living in the United States.

172. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977).
173. If one of the prohibited classifications is a factor in a landlord's decision
not to rent, he may be sued under the Fair Housing Act even though the landlord's
expressed reason is the economic undesirability of the tenant. See Smith v. Sol D.
Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld a landlord's rule that required tenants to have a weekly
net income equal to at least 90 percent of their monthly rent or to furnish a co-signer
or guarantor who met even stricter standards, although the rule had a discriminatory
impact on welfare recipients, of whom 77% were either black or Puerto Rican. Boyd
v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975).
.174. Municipal zoning decisions that exclude low income persons have been
found to violate the Fair Housing Act if their purpose or effect is to discriminate
against persons for any of the reasons enunciated in that Act. See Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F.
Supp. 669, 694 (W.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971).
In Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982), low-income black
residents sued the town and its officials, complaining that the town's withdrawal from
a multi-municipality low-income housing authority was racially motivated. The court
of appeals held a finding that the town's actions had a racially disproportionate impact in violation of the Fair Housing Act and were racially motivated in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. However, the court held that the trial court acted improperly when it ordered the town to construct units from its own locally generated
funds. The court noted that a town has no independent duty to construct low-income
housing for its residents, and that the remedy was disproportionate to the wrong
committed. The court stated that a proper remedy would be to require the town to
reinstate the procedures and plans in place prior to the withdrawal and to require it
to pursue those plans aggressively and in good faith.

